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NOTE
The New World Information Order: A Legal
Framework for Debate
by Bryan J. Holzberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
The General Conference [of UNESCO] expresses the wish that UNESCO
demonstrate its willingness in its short and medium-term activities to
contribute to the delineation, broadening and application of the concept
of a New World Information Order.'
T HIS 1980 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) declaration, in response to an exhaustive re-
port on international communications, focused on the right of communi-
cation in an attempt to internationally proclaim and regulate a New
World Information Order (NWIO). The debate process, which has yet to
settle on binding legal principles, impinges upon both national responses
to a claimed right of communication and upon international agencies act-
ing in the field of communications.
The debate, thus far, has been acrimonious, with significant legal, so-
cial, and economic overtones. As chronicled,2 the developing world3 al-
leges that the West is guilty of political and cultural imperialism. One
instrument of this "concerted" policy is communication. At a' time when
States have come to depend upon interconnected international informa-
tion flows, the developed world dominates the Third World with: its con-
trol over communication collection and dissemination resources; its sheer
financial power; and, its division of the scarce electromagnetic spectrum
*J.D. Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1981).
Resolution of the 21st General Conference of UNESCO, as excerpted in LeDuc, East-
West News Flow Imbalance: Qualifying the Quantifications, 31 J. CoM. 147 (1981).
' For an overview of Third World complaints, see Masmoudi, The New World Informa-
tion Order, 29 J. Com. 172 (1979).
3 For the purposes of this article the terms "developing states" and "Third World" are
synonymous. They signify countries undergoing rapid economic expansion and
diversification.
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on which such development aids as. broadcast, education, and meteorol-
ogy depend. The result is overpowering, transforming the legal, economic,
and cultural fabric of developing States into copies of already developed
models.
Much has been written concerning specific issues raised in the NWIO
debate.4 However, few attempts have been made to explore the interrela-
tionships of legal norms, technological changes, and social and political
processes as they concern communication. The concept of the right to
communicate and the methods by which States control internal flows of
communications will be explored. Technological changes regarding acqui-
sition devices and information management have added to the issue of
the equitable distribution of the electromagnetic spectrum. The parame-
ters of this surveyed issue will be based on attempting to balance in-
formation flows between countries.
An outgrowth of the NWIO debate is that communication and the
mass media have become issues within the ambit of international law;,
therein lies an outline for a new order. Thus, this Note will make recom-
mendations which would affect this order within international agencies
and national constructs.
II. LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE
A system of legal analysis in an international context is essentially
meaningless unless the right to communicate can be made universally
comprehensible and is flexible enough to account for technological
change. At the outset, it is important to determine whether the right to
communicate, as expressed in the NWIO debate, is a legal doctrine, or
instead, merely a term of art used to set priorities in controlling interna-
tional communication. Distinguishing these perspectives will then aid in
analyzing the central points of the NWIO debate by placing the debate in
a legal, historical, and socioeconomic perspective.
A. International Constructs
The U.N. Charter enunciates principles of equal rights and self-de-
termination for all peoples, 5 the prohibition of force by a State in any
manner inconsistent with U.N. purposes,6 and prohibitions against U.N.
or individual State intervention into the domestic matters of another
'For a list of documents on the study of communication problems see, INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD 297
(1980) [hereinafter The MacBride Report].
U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 2.
Id. at art. 2 para. 4.
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State.7 The U.N. Charter is not a neutral document; it purports to stand
for the ideology of self-dignity and support for self-determination.8 In
this context, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights indicates
additional normative expectations supporting communications: "Every-
one has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers." The Declaration also limits the freedom of expression:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of secur-
ing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order, and the gen-
eral welfare in a democratic society.10
The definition of "law" is an important constraint on this principle.
The "just requirements" of "a democratic society" are also undefined lim-
itations. Although deprivation of these "human rights" is to be "deter-
mined by law," thereby excluding extralegal deprivations, the conditions
defining when such limitations may occur appear to be ideologically
based. Arguably, governmental limitations on communications may be di-
rected under law and yet violative of a right to self-determination.11
When coupled with force, they become inconsistent with the spirit of the
U.N. Charter. 2
The Helsinki Accords of 1975,13 although not legally binding on the
34 signators, represent another documented expectation of free communi-
cation. In addition to a reaffirmation of human rights,14 the Accords spe-
cifically aim "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of informa-
tion of all kinds ... and to improve the conditions under which
journalists from one participating state exercise their profession in an-
other participating state.1
1 5
7Id. at art. 2 para. 7.
8 Id. at Preamble.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948) at art. 19, reprinted in L. SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, BAsIc DOcUMENTs ON INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (1974).
10 Id. at art. 29, para. 2.
, Human Rights are implicitly bound to the jurisprudence of any state that calls itself
"free" or "democratic" as noted by McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L.
REV. 1, 16-18 (1966).
12 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 Para. 7.
11 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
14 Id. at art. VII.
15 Id.
1982
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B. National Legislation
Also of significance are those national legal principles and regulations
which are applicable to transnational communication. Most modem
States guarantee the right to communicate in some form."6 This right in-
cludes both the rights to impart and to receive information and view-
points. Yet, these same States all maintain a variety of legal restrictions
on the right of communication. 17 Libel and obscenity statutes and the
allocation of broadcast channel access are examples of such restrictions.
Public international law is a basic source for national legislation. The
law of treaties and international conventions is such that the substance of
United Nations, UNESCO and International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) provisions, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provisions concerning communication, has provided the basis for domes-
tic statutes and constitutional law.'8
Constitutional law generally establishes a law of communication
through broad principles; jurisprudence and statutory language then
transform this body of law into precise regulations. Furthermore, profes-
sional organizations have established codes and councils which are impor-
tant sources of laws concerning communication. 9 However, differences in
legal vocabulary and national systems create difficulties with the direct
comparison of terminology and classification.
1. Constitutional law: the U.S. model
The U.N. Charter and Universal Declaration have inspired many
States to include specific guarantees for free communication within the
context of human rights.2 Other States have followed a model estab-
lished by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). 2 The U.S.
Constitution, with its penchant for free speech guarantees, has similarly
16 See, e.g., CONST. art. 79 §§ 1-2 (Kenya), CONST. art. 8 (Senegal) and CONST. art. I § 15
(Liberia) reprinted in A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (1974); CONST. art. 15 (Italy),
CONST. art. 28 §§ 1-2 (Czechoslovakia), CONST. art. 9 (Finland), CONST. art. 10 § 3 (Chile),
CONST. art. 150 §§ 9-10 (Brazil) and CONST. art. 32 (Cuba), reprinted in A. PEASLEE, CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF NATIONS (1965).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., C. MACDOUGALL, INTERPRETATIvE REPORTING 24 (7th ed. 1977).
20 See, e.g., CONST. art. 8 (Senegal), CONST. art. 11 (Zaire) and CONST. art. 40 (Guinea)
reprinted in A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (1974); CONST. art. 20 (Spain) reprinted
in Glos, The New Spanish Constitution Comments and Full Text, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
47, 83-84.
21 CONST. art. 39 (U.S.S.R.), reprinted in W. BUTLER, COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE
USSR AND CONSTITUENT UNION REPUBLICS. See also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR AND
THE UNION REPUBLICS (F.J.M. Feldbragge ed. 1979).
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inspired other constitutions. 22
It is important to place the U.S. Constitution and its historical devel-
opment in perspective before analyzing its impact upon other national
norms. In this regard, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's views
are particularly influential in coloring much of the recent Supreme Court
activity in the field of communications.23
In a lecture presented in a communications seminar, Justice Stewart
observed:
For centuries before our Revolution, the press in England had been li-
censed, censored, and bedeviled by prosecutions for seditious libel. The
British Crown knew that a free press was not just a neutral vehicle for
the balanced discussion of diverse ideas. Instead, the free press meant
organized, expert scrutiny of government .... This formidable check on
official power was what the British Crown had feared-and what the
American Founders decided to risk.24
A natural progression of this history was the seeming simplicity of the
first amendment of the U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law
. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. 2 5 This amendment
was an outgrowth of the struggles chronicled by Blackstone: "Every free-
man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press."2
Often judges in U.S. courts are called upon to explain the first
amendment in its press application as did Justice Stewart when he wrote:
"If the constitutional protection of a free press means anything, it means
that government cannot take it upon itself to decide what a newspaper
may and may not publish." 27 But, U. S. case law need not distinguish
between the press and other forms of speech. It is all "communication"
and information, and a "fundamental personal right"28 which fosters the
"social interest in the attainment of truth."29
22 U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., Liberia supra note 17, CONST. art. 38 (Colombia) and
CONsT. art. 14 (Argentina), reprinted in A. PEASLEE, CONsTrruTiONS OF NATiONS (1965).
23 See generally Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and
the Autonomous Press, 7 HoFsTRA L. REv. 563 (1979).
24 Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L. J. 631, 634 (1975).
25 See U.S. CONST., supra note 22.
26 W. BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151-52 (Dawson's reprint
of 1st ed. 1966).
27 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 820, 849 (Stewart, J. concur-
ring 1978).
28 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
29 Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs 33 (1941), quoted in Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (Powell, J. dissenting 1974).
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2. Constitutional law: the communications context
Most national constitutions explicitly acknowledge the right of com-
munication as a fundamental freedom. The U.S.S.R. declares that: "In
accordance with the interests of the working people and with a view to
strengthening the Socialist system, citizens of the U.S.S.R. shall be guar-
anteed the freedom of: speech, press, assembly, meetings, street proces-
sions, and demonstrations."30
India, a major non-aligned State, promises that: "All citizens have
the right of freedom of speech, assembly, association, movement, resi-
dence, property, and profession." 1 More ambiguously, Mexico pledges
that: "The expression of ideas shall not be subject to any judicial or ad-
ministrative investigation, unless it offend[s] good morals, impair[s] the
rights of good parties, incite[s] to crime or cause[s] a breach of the
peace."32
One of the newest constitutions also appears to offer the fullest pro-
tection for communication. In 1978, Spain rewrote its Constitution to in-
clude extensive sections on the right to communicate by means of speech,
press,33 or image 4 along with a right of access to government-controlled
media.3 5
As might be expected when comparing differing sociopolitical sys-
tems, some constitutions, such as that of Mexico, stress fundamental
rights,38 while others, such as that in the U.S.S.R., temper the rights and
freedoms granted by stressing the individual's fundamental duties to the
State.3 7 The U.S.S.R. also requires its citizens to uphold the dignity of
citizenship.38 And, in the case of India, guarantees must be read alongside
constitutional provisions which stipulate the supremacy of State policy
over fundamental rights.39 In this regard, fundamental freedoms may not
be exercised to the detriment of the State, to society, or to any other
citizen.40
30 USSR, supra note 21 at art. 50.
3' CONST. art. 19(1) (India), reprinted in A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (1974).
32 CONST. art. 6 (Mexico), reprinted in A. PEASLEE, supra note 23. CONSTITUTIONS OF
NATIONS (1965).
33 Glos, supra note 20, at art. 20.
5 Id.
8 See Mexico, supra note 32.
17 USSR, supra note 21, at art. 39.
USSR, supra note 21, at art. 59.
39 India, supra note 31, at §§ 4 and 11.
40 Id. at art. 39.
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3. Laws of limitation
More important to a definition of the right to communicate are those
restrictions which are established by subsequent law and practice, or em-
bodied in a State's constitution. These restrictions vary from country to
country, and in fact (as with differing libel and obscenity statutes in each
of the United States) within regions of a country. Although it is difficult
to arrive at general conclusions based on the great diversity of political,
religious, and social restrictions directed toward the right to communi-
cate, it can be stated that no country allows an unchallenged right of
communication.'
Thus, by comparison, the United States has reduced limitations to a
minimum. Restrictions on the right to communicate serve to protect
against defamation,'4 2 obscenity,43 internal disorder, 44 and external aggres-
sion.45 Conversely, the U.S.S.R. provides for national civil actions in the
case of defamation and considers the legal requirement of correction and
retraction integral to damages.46 A unique application of this provision
recently occurred when the Soviet Government sued two U.S. correspon-
dents for an alleged libel which took place outside Soviet jurisdiction.47
The two American journalists dispatched accounts from the U.S.S.R.
regarding the confession of a Soviet dissident, along with disputes as to
the veracity of the confession.' Although these accounts appeared only in
American newspapers, the Soviet Committee for Television and Radio
sued in Soviet court, claiming that its honor and dignity had been
threatened and maligned.49 International law does permit the extraterri-
torial application of domestic law,50 however, extraterritorial defamation
suits are rare. In this case, the two American journalists were found
guilty" and their newspapers were obliged to pay sizable fines, but they
did not issue retractions. 2
This case illustrates the differing perspectives on the right to com-
41 See The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 207-08.
42 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1941).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See U.S. CONST. art. M § 3; see also Cramer v. U.S. 325 U.S. 1 (1944).
"' CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSsIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC [hereinafter
RSFSR] art. 7, reprinted in RSFSR (trans. Gray and Stults 1965).
47 See generally, Note, The Free Press and Its Territorial Limitations: United States
Correspondents in the Soviet Courts, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 348 (1979).
40 N.Y. Times, May 20, 1978, at 7, col. 1.
41 N.Y. Times, June 29, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
50 L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER AND H. SmIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (2d ed.
1980).
51 N.Y. Times, June 30, 1978, at 6, col. 1.
52 N.Y. Times, August 4, 1978, at 5, col. 1.
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municate. A state obviously perpetuates its political philosophies through
legal mechanisms, even where that definition restricts communication to
that of an uncontroversial nature and curtails the right to communicate
between States."
Another limitation on communication is illustrated in Mexico's Con-
stitution. As noted above, the freedom of expression of ideas is upheld; "
however, in times of "serious conflicts in society," the President is em-
powered to suspend the guarantees. 5
The germ of restrictive disease is present in any such principle. All
States prohibit publications injurious to national security.56 Furthermore,
prohibitions may extend to a wider range of subject matters. 57 States may
desire to attain the ideals embodied in their constitutions, but evolving
political and social structures often mitigate against proclaiming a "per-
petual" state of emergency. Nam and Oh, after extensive study, have con-
cluded that an "emergency" is often a synonym for the overburdening of
the political forces of a country.5 8 Whereas the communication systems in
the West have evolved within the incremental development of their coun-
tries as a whole,59 this study suggests that the demand for the quick de-
velopment of a country creates intolerance both of critics and the free-
dom of communication.60
4. Defining and regulating communication systems
No State truly defines its guarantee to a right to communicate,
without first defining "information." For instance, should there be any
"The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 248-49.
See Mexico, supra note 32.
55 Id. at art. 29.
The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 207-10.
" In 1975, India imposed a State of Emergency which included provisions for the cen-
sorship of all matters necessary for the public safety, maintaining public order, and for the
civil and national defense. These provisions, incorporated into the Constitution, permitted
the State to seize newspapers and arrest writers and editors of offending articles (including
those responsible for truthful accounts of parliamentary proceedings). When one editor
challegned the official censor, the Indian Court wrote: "Dissent from the opinions and views
held by the majority and criticism and disapproval of measures initiated by a power, make
for a healthy political climate, and it is not for the Censor to inject into this the lifelessness
of forced conformity." The "emergency" continued until a new government was elected, on
March 20, 1977. One of the first actions of the new government was to rescind the various
censorship provisions in effect under the emergency. See Irani, The Press Emergency in
India, 31 NEMAN REPORTS 49 (1977).
" Nam & Oh, Press Freedom: Function of Subsystem Autonomy, 50 JOURNALISM Q.
744 (1973).
59 Address by A. Dershowitz, Conference on Freedom of the Press (Case Western Re-
serve School of Law, April 18, 1980).
'0 See Nam, supra note 58, at 745.
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distinctions between such disparate communications as editorial, cultural,
entertainment, or documentary reportage? States must also build into
their legal systems the flexibility to confront technological changes that
may eliminate the telecommunications regulations premised upon the no-
tion of domestic channel scarcity. Only after such definitions are realized
may there be a basis for modifying existing practices which inhibit the
international flow of communication.
There are three basic forms of communication, and each creates
unique legal, political, and social issues. The first type is the point-to-
point system. Its operation is based on the delivery of messages from a
sender to a designated recipient in forms ranging from personal courier to
satellite."' The second format is the one-to-many system which pertains
to mass media requiring a technical infrastructure. This approach offers a
variety of structural patterns according to the roles placed upon them by
the State and by the sophistication of the society. Finally, interpersonal
communications make up an integral part of the public communications
system.
Policy issues which affect the definition of communication and the
development of international communication include: ownership, financ-
ing, and the degree of social supervision. Social supervision intrudes di-
rectly upon questions of media content, which in turn are a major focus of
the NWIO.
Although there are disparate laws governing the communicators,
these laws are essentially divided into State control of communication en-
terprises and private operations conditioned by a number of formalities. 62
No hard and fast conclusions can be drawn as to whether specific
1 Many of these services are controlled by a domestic Postal Administration, with in-
ternational flows regulated by the Universal Postal Union; public or private telephone ser-
vices determine tariffs and service standards in accordance with domestic regulatory bodies
In addition to controlling communication processes, many States seek to retain sovereignty
over data bases. To this end, access to data is being restricted and legal remedies are being
developed in a manner comparable to that found in United States. See U.S. Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
Data protectionism in general is beyond the scope this article. For an overview of legal
issues raised by transborder data flows, see Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, The Transborder
Transfer of Information by Communications and Computer Systems: Issues and Ap-
proaches to Guiding Principles, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1974).
82 The MacBride Report supra note 4, at 120, reported a trend towards increasing in-
volvement of the State in communications enterprises. This is the case not only in Commu-
nist Governments, where communications are part of the overall political program of the
State, but also in many developing States. Developing States may find the need for both
establishing and maintaining the communications infrastructure since private economic in-
centives might be slight. Formalities conditioning the communications infrastructure are
thus divided into mechanisms for social control, pre-operational requisities, control of mate-
rial resources, and financial constraints and incentives.
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ideological or economic systems foster public communication systems.
Many communications systems are owned outright or by a controlling po-
litical party. 3 For instance, 47 of 71 newspapers published in Africa are
owned by the State, and only 20 newspapers are fully private enter-
prises."' Mixed systems of State and private enterprises do exist.6 5
Sri Lanka offers an apparently unique approach to communications
systems through its legislation which effectively reduces private monopoly
control in newspapers. By statute, 25 percent of large newspapers may be
privately owned, but 75 percent of the corporate shares must be distrib-
uted to the public, often to State surrogates.6 6
Telecommunications, by contrast, is subject to State involvement by
every country.6 7 This control ranges from the monopolistic regulation of
the limited electromagnetic spectrum 8 to direct state broadcasts, 9 and
day-to-day management responsibility for broadcast units. Again, using
Africa as an example, all broadcast systems on the continent are State-
operated except for those in Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritius, and Malawi.
7 0
Privately-owned communication systems often require operational
formalities and involve regulating the activity of individuals within the
communications enterprise. 1 States such as Sweden, Italy, and France
also "interfere" with the functioning of communication enterprises
through the use of subsidies.7 2
Overall, developed States have few regulations requiring prior au-
thorization before a communication enterprise may operate.7 3 Generaliza-
tions are risky, however, because many States, including Western coun-
63 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS, SURVEY OF
NATIONAL LEGISLATION (2) Report No. 24 at 3 (1979).
" Id.
65 Id. Examples include Liberia, Sudan, and Tanzania, where national newspapers print
under Government authority, but must arrange for their own financing.
" Id. at 4-5.
67 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 120.
68 The United States provides an example where the Federal Communications Commis-
sion regulates the private sector. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Supreme Court that,
"The facilities of the radio are simply not large enough to accomodate all who wished to use
them . .. Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many who apply." Na-
tional Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
69 See E. KATZ & G. WEDDELL, BROADCASTING IN THE THIRD WORLD (1978).
70 SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 63, at 6-9.
1 See generally id. at 6-13. Many countries have requirements concerning owners and
editors. These same countries draw their media personnel from government representatives.
Age and education requirements are also noted in this Report and it is likely that "closed
shop" practices exist in some countries, where employment is limited to union members.
7'2 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 101. Subsidies vary in form from tax-relief, to
direct grants-in-aid, to distribution assistance, quoting Smith, Subsidies and the Press in
Europe, 43 POL. & ECON. PLAN. 569 (1977).
71 See SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 63, at 6-13.
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tries, do impose constraints such as government authorization,
conditional registration and print-runs, a required legal deposit (bond),
and limitations on the number of media outlets.74
Common forms of authorization include conditional publication per-
mits (as required by Ghana) 7 5 and specific pre-publication declarations
to a public prosecutor (as required by France).7 6 France also requires a
pre-publication legal deposit 7 that, as in other countries,78 functions as a
prosecutorial bond in the event of legal action against the communication
enterprise.
Newspaper prices,7 9 advertising prices and content,80 and printing
runs s are also subject to regulation. Similar control or regulation may
take the form of governmental subsidies of the enterprise. Subsidies may
be used to maintain a diversity of publications (where made to all enter-
prises or in a form of tax abatements and postal and distribution aid) as
in Sweden, 2 or to assert political interference.
Much legislation directed toward a nationality requirement, usually
requiring that owners and financial backers of a communications enter-
prise be citizens of that State.83 Editors must also be identified in each
issue of a newspaper, as in Australia,8 along with the publisher and
printer, as in Gabon;85 generally, there is an added requirement that such
individuals not be legislators.8
News agencies may be controlled by States much as are newspapers.
A number of news agencies operate independently from the State, even
where the State, as in France8 7 with the Agence-France Presse (AFP), was
instrumental in setting up the agency or receives revenues from the
agency. Agency cooperatives, whose beneficiaries are its owners, are also
operational8 and are frequently organized in legal form as commercial
74 Id.
71 Id. at 11.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 13.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 12.
8o Id.
81 Id. at 9.
82 Id. at 15.
83 Id. at 6-7.
84 Id. at 8.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 9.
87 A. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION 85 (1980).
88 These range from combining a number of news agencies into a larger agency, owned
by the organization which they serve, such as the Caribbean News Agency (CANA) which
serves 16 outlets in 6 Caribbean countries, to the Associated Press (AP), the largest co-
operative with over 1,320 members.
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enterprises. State agencies, however, are the most common form of news
agencies.8
Degrees of State control over agencies range from the agency being a
cultural and informational distributor linked to a Ministry of Information
as in Syria,90 or Culture, as in Czechoslovakia,92 to a public authority en-
joying large legal and financial autonomy, as in Malaysia.2 Many agencies
are the sole distributors of foreign news in their countries.92 Every news
agency has a code of objectives and principles. These goals may be estab-
lished by legislation " and, as in Nigeria, a Council of Trustees may over-
see everyday adherence to the code.9 5
Governments also implement policies limiting the private sector's al-
location of essential media resources; one result is that printing paper im-
ports, a commodity which is in short supply internationally98 may be reg-
ulated or manipulated.9 7 Newspaper size, circulation, and advertisements
are all subject to governmental regulation, 8 especially if a government
wishes to reward favorable coverage.9 9 Broadcast communications may
also be inhibited by import controls on technical production and receiving
equipment.
C. Professional Constraints and Evolution
The Western concept of the mass media is a temporally evolving doc-
trine ascribing rights and duties to purveyors and practitioners of com-
munications. Today, much of the Western communication milieu operates
under the principles of objectivity and impartiality.10 0 Historically, the
flow of communication development has been one of transplanting these
values along with technologies to colonies, and later, to the developing
world.101
However, journalists in developing States need not be judged by
:9 SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 63, at 16-19.
0o Id. at 18.
91 Id. at 17.
92 Id. at 10.
11 A large majority of foreign dispatches are received by state-run agencies, who in turn
edit and distribute articles to domestic publications. See, e.g., L. Sussmw4, MAss NEWS ME-
DIA AND THE THIRD WORLD CHALLENGE, V Washington Papers 10 (1977).
:4 SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 63, at 26.




:9 See Irani, supra note 61.
10 A journalist's entire training is devoted to overcoming or sidestepping his prejudices.
C. MAcDOUGALL, supra note 20, at 12.
201 Pool, The Mass Media and Politics in the Modernization Process, in CoMMuim-
TIONS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 234 (C. Pye ed. 1963).
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these Western standards. The institutions receiving new technologies in
developing States often differ from those Western institutions which
helped create the technology. 10 2 Thus, journalists, broadcast units, and
other communication institutions in developing States are often evolving
under close local governmental supervision.
0 3
"It is maintained that the adoption of any definition whatever [of
journalists] generally leads to the official licensing of journalists."'
There is a trend for States to continue their guarantees of free communi-
cation and, while not explicitly defining communication, singling out jour-
nalists to function under special limitations.105 The licensing and accredi-
tation of journalists implicitly set forth a legal definition from which
specific protections for journalistic communications may result. Yet, the
more important result is that government intrudes at the core of the right
to communication by monitoring the purveyors of communication and,
therefore, develops legal obligations for journalists which permeate all
forms of speech.
One substitute for direct definition and, as such, control over the
communication media, while retaining freedom of expression, is self-regu-
lation by the media. Such regulation starts with an ad hoc decision by
practitioners as to who should be regulated. Regulations take the form of
codes of ethics with disciplinary measures10s and may include quasi-judi-
cial councils of adjudication over complaints against the communication
media.107 Councils have been established by statute10 s or by private con-
tributors 0 9 and have jurisdiction over all mass media. Authority exists
102 For example, see Matta, The Latin American Concept of News, 29 J. CoM. 164, 165-
66 (1979). See also W. EMERY, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF BROADCASTING 17
(1969).
103 Western technologies offered to other societies often become instruments of the lo-
cal elites or are inoperable without modifications for local needs. Thus, in Nigeria, the Fed-
eral Government received Western broadcasting technologies and beamed a number of
Western-produced programs, along with locally-produced materials, on a national television
system. However, this national system was unable to overcome differences in religion,
ethnicity, and language. Regional stations were also set up, but they failed to attract com-
mercial economic support. As a result, the medium was controlled by ruling groups, without
any competing broadcasters of input into the network. E. KATz & G. WEDDELL, supra note
69.
I" The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 237.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 241-44. These ethics commonly include promoting truthfulness, accuracy, and
freedom of access, though proscribing libel, privacy, and obscenity. Id.
107 Id. For instance, the U.S. National News Council receives complaints against publi-
cations, investigates the allegations, and then issues a written opinion on the matter, includ-
ing, upon occasion, dissents.
108 Bertrand, Press Councils Around the World; Unraveling a Definitional Dilemma,
55 JOURNALISM Q. 241 (1978).
109 Interview with officials of the U.S. National News Council (New York City 1980).
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within the councils to impose penalties ranging from legal sanctions110 to
the less formal, but perhaps more effective, ability to mobilize profes-
sional and public opinion."u
III. THE ROLE OF UNESCO
UNESCO is a U.N. organization whose purpose is to promote and
protect international human rights."2 As such, it has become a primary
forum for discussions of the New World Information Order.
A. Structure and Policy
The legal basis for UNESCO's involvement with human rights, and
with the debate on communication, is its constitution. Specifically,
UNESCO is charged with the duty of "promoting collaboration among
the nations ... in order to further universal respect for justice, for the
rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms" of the
U.N. Charter."13 Furthermore, UNESCO is empowered to achieve this
purpose by recommending "such international agreements as may be nec-
essary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image.' ' 14
Every two years, all member countries convene at a General Confer-
ence to determine UNESCO's program and budget.2 5 During this Confer-
ence, reports and actions taken by member States are considered in re-
sponse to previous Conference recommendations and reports.
A majority of UNESCO's member States may be classified as devel-
oping States. They are aware of the potential for other countries to de-
velop the means and structures necessary to transmit and receive infor-
mation. They are also aware of imbalances in the origin and manufacture
of this information and in communication channels, as well as the impact
that foreign communications have upon their own culture and value sys-
tems."16 UNESCO has tried to reconcile these shared State views, not al-
ways successfully, with those views of members having a deep ideological
and legal attachment to the right to communicate. For example, the 1972
General Conference accepted a declaration on satellite broadcasting
which featured nondiscrimination in the availability of such broadcasting,
the right of individual States to determine the content of their own
1:0 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 245.
" For many years the U.S. Council expressed its views of such opinions and transac-
tions in the COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
"2 UNESCO CONST., entered into force Nov. 4, 1946, 61 Stat. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 1580,
4 U.N.T.S. 275, Preamble.
113 Id. at art. 1, para. 1 emphasis added by author.
"1 Id. at art. 1, para. 2 (a).
Id. at art. 4, para. 6.
11 See Masmoudi, supra note 2.
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broadcasts, and the promotion of accurate broadcasts.117
B. The Evolving Communications Debate
UNESCO's interest in communication has intensified in recent years,
gradually reaching the current level of discussion during a General Con-
ference. As indicated by an approved plan of activities for 1977-1982, this
interest is now firmly established: "Communication ... is an essential
component of a new social and economic order, and equal access to infor-
mation sources and flows between and within societies is necessary for its
establishment."""5
At the 1972 General Conference, the U.S.S.R. introduced a resolution
entitled, "A Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the
Use of the Mass Media in Strengthening Peace and International Under-
standing and in Combating War, Propaganda, Racism, and Apartheid."'1
This proposal received considerable opposition120 and, as a result, a re-
vised declaration was placed on the agenda of the 1976 Nairobi General
Conference. 2 '
Two sections of the revised proposal received particular attention at
the Nairobi Conference. Representatives from developed nations criti-
cized proposed articles that would have permitted States to rectify, using
the same medium, those media accounts which they considered errone-
ous,122 and placed responsibility for all international media in the hands
of the State from which that communication originated.' 53 Other propos-
117 Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free
Flow of Information, the Spread of Education, and Greater Cultural Exchange, 17
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec. 67 (1973) UNESCO Doc. 17 C/Resolution.
Is UNESCO, MEDIUM TERM PLAN (1977-1982) Objective 9.1 at 299, UNESCO Doc. 19
C/4.
119 UNESCO Doc. 19 C/91 (1976).
120 UNESCO Res. 4.143, 19 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 53, UNESCO Doc. 19 C/Res.
(1977).
121 Id. In the interim, the Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Conference was held and a decla-
ration announced that, "the ever growing gap between communication capacities in the
Non-Aligned countries and the advanced countries ... has created a situation of depen-
dence and domination. . . "Pinch, The Flow of News: An Assessment of the Non-Aligned
News Agency Pool, 28 J. COM. 163 (Autumn 1978). A non-aligned news pool was then
formed with the Yugoslavian agency, Tanjug, as its base.
After such actions, the United States began to lobby against the proposal. As Clayton
Kirkpatrick, a member of the United States delegation, said, "Acceptance of the draft would
put the moral sanction of UNESCO on the side of controlled and subservient mass media."
Telephone interview with C. Kirkpatrick, Editor, Chicago Tribune (November 1980).
122 Tartarian, News Flow in the Third World, THE THnm WoRLD AmD PREsS FaREOM
18 (P. Horton ed. 1978).
123 Id. Art. X: "States, institutions or groups which consider that the circulation of er-
roneous news reports has seriously impaired their action with a view to the strengthening of
peace and international understanding and their efforts to combat war, propaganda, racism,
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als for redressing communications concerns were also placed before the
General Conference. These issues dealt with complaints against coverage
of the Third World by suggesting mechanisms for improving the training
and cultural awareness of all journalists and upgrading communication
systems in the developing States. 12 4
In response to the sharp differences which emerged on the NWIO
issue, and evidenced at the Nairobi Conference, a compromise Declara-
tion on Mass Media was issued. 25 This was the first specific U.N. doc-
trine on mass media. 2 6 The Director-General of UNESCO was also em-
powered to appoint a commission for the study of communication
problems.11 This Commission (the MacBride Commission) was estab-
lished in 1977 with a mandate to develop "measures aimed at reducing
the communications gap existing between developed and developing
countries and at achieving a freer and more balanced international flow of
information.'
28
The Commission held eight public sessions and published its final
report (MacBride Report) in February 1980.129 Eighty-two recommenda-
tions were made by the Commission to the 1980 General Conference in
Belgrade. 30 Twelve issues on topics such as the protection of journalists
and the scarcity of financial resources for development were also noted in
the Report as requiring further study.' 8 ' Yet, once again, intense debate
between developed and developing States precluded definitive action on
communications. 3 2 The Director-General of UNESCO said that there
was "no need for immediate action at this stage,"' 3 and postponed a vote
on any of the MacBride Report recommendations until the 1983 General
and apartheid, should be able to rectify such news reports through the mass media." Art.
XII: "States are responsible for the activities in the international sphere of all mass media
under their jurisdiction." Id. Taken literally, such a principle would have made the U. S.
Government responsible for any alleged libels published by Soviet correspondents in the
United States as the Soviet Union tried to do. See supra notes 46-52.
124 Tartarian, supra note 122, at 19.
15 Androunas and Zassoursky, UNESCO's Mass Media Declaration: A Forum of Three
Worlds, 29 J. COM. 190-91 (1979).
120 Nordengtreng, Behind the Semantics - A Strategic Design, 29 J. COM. 195, 196-97
(1979).
127 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at c. 14.
12s Id. at 295.
129 Id. at 296.
1so Id. at 253-72.
31 Id. at 273-75.
132 As an illustration, representatives of Western news organizations held a conference
in Taillores, France to issue a counter declaration to UNESCO entitled "Voices of Free-
dom." N.Y. Times, May 24, 1981, at B3, col. 1. Declaration reprinted in Singh & Gross,
"MacBride": The Report and the Response, 31 J. CoM. 113-115 (1981).
133 Power, The U.S. View of Belgrade, 31 J. COM. 144 (1981).
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Conference in Venezuela. 13 4
The Belgrade Conference did approve two actions designed to imple-
ment aspects of the NWIO. First, under guidance of the UNESCO Secre-
tariat, a compromise draft proposal was requested by the Conference
whereby a UNESCO body would be created to issue identity cards to
journalists that could be withdrawn if undefined codes of journalistic eth-
ics were violated. 13 5 Second, the United States proposed a UNESCO-
based clearinghouse for communication development assistance which
was approved by the Conference. 8" The clearinghouse, termed the Inter-
national Program for Development of Communication (IPDC), was
designed to encourage voluntary assistance by developed States to foster
the communications enterprises of developing States.137 In effect, the
West has exhibited a desire to direct the NWIO debates towards develop-
ing communications infrastructures along with adapting local require-
ments to the rapid advancements of communication technologies.,"
Contributions to the IPDC have come from the Netherlands, India,
Mexico, and Iraq;139 various U.S. press organizations claim that they have
promised additional aid. As the IPDC develops, the U.S. delegation to
UNESCO hopes to direct its policies toward practical assistance appro-
priately funded and devoid of political considerations.1 40 A positive step
in this direction was taken by the IPDC's first grant, issued in January
1982. One hundred thousand dollars was approved to assist in the forma-
tion of a Pan-African news agency designed to reduce dependence by Af-
rican States on Western agencies for African news.14' One problem with
this proposal is that few African States have sufficiently developed news
agency resources to help this program and most African communication
systems are State-controlled and geared to positive State news.'4 2
IV. THE MAcBRIDE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS
Arguably, a watershed in the NWIO debate was reached when the
final MacBride Report to UNESCO was published.'4 3 It is the first com-
13 N.Y. Times, October 23, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
11 N.Y. Times, May 24, 1981, at E3 col. 1.
116 Harley, The U.S. Stake in the IPDC, 31 J. COM. 150 (1981).




141 Riding, New Information Order: Debating Pragmatics, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER 13
(Jan. 30, 1982).
142 SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 63, at 3.
143 The MacBride Report, supra note 4.
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prehensive study of international communication and serves to establish
the parameters for future debates on international communication. In
1980, UNESCO member States were told to study the report so that it
could serve as the impetus for declarations and international action taken
on communications during the 1983 General. Conference.14
The MacBride Report is organized into five broad subsections: 1) a
broad societal definition of communication; 2) a description of the forms
and structures of communications and its participants; 3) a problem anal-
ysis on the operations of communications; 4) the institutional and profes-
sional framework; and 5) recommendations and issues requiring further
study. 45 The first section of the Report colors those recommendations.
4
"
It is "receiver-oriented" with a philosophy that those who will receive
communication will benefit from it. Access and equalization are, there-
fore, central to the final document; how to allow diverse peoples to reach
and use communication structures and, once there, how to promote bal-
anced use and coverage.
A. A Cultural and Social Dimension to the Report
An "impartial" press is a recent phenomenon in developed States.
Political and governmental patronage in relation to national forces influ-
enced most communications 47 until the influx of private capital, through
advertising, permitted the development of a relatively politically neutral
press.148 The importance of advertising has yet to manifest itself in the
Third World as an agent promoting independent thought.
As an illustration, India has an advertising market of $93 million149
as compared to a $1,734 million market in the United Kingdom.' 50 West-
ern advertising agencies not only dominate their own domestic markets,
but also control large percentages of developing markets and project
Western philosophies on consumer goods and mass entertainment.' 51 In-
deed, developing countries present an attractive market for expansion of
both Western advertising and entertainment. Britain has begun to export
television programs as a direct response to a stagnant domestic market
and financial pressures. 15 2 The British Broadcasting Corporation has,
144 Resolution of the UNESCO 21st General Conference on the Findings of the Inter-
national Commission for the Study of Communication, exerpted in Power, supra note 133,
at 146-47.
MThe MacBride Report, supra note 4.
14 Id. at Pt. One.
147 See Dershowitz, supra note 59.
148 Id.
149 SMrI, supra note 87, at 45-46.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 47.
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thus, more than doubled its revenues in recent years."'3
France and the United States are other developed countries which
are profiting from broadcast exports to developing States, perhaps bene-
fiting from their economies of scale. These broadcasts are sold to, and
broadcast in, developing States and play to an audience which is aware of
differences in quality between domestic and foreign broadcasts, but which
does not necessarily comprehend the cultural background of the foreign
broadcasts. Few broadcasts from developing States, however, are shown
to Western viewers.""
Thus, a strong imbalance is apparent in the flow of communications.
Equipment and technical expertise are too often foreign-controlled or
supplied, often without sensitive adaptations to a local market. Literacy,
linguistic and caste loyalties, elite and non-elite group schisms are all fac-
tors which fragment many developing States, and help to shape attitudes
toward building communication within a modem State. Conversely, com-
munication in developed States is predicated on a cohesive, mass audi-
ence. Yet, it is this developed economic and organizational model which
has been introduced into developing States. The potential is for greater
amenability on the part of those States toward the infiltration of Western
patterns, at the expense of the receiving States' norms.
The MacBride Report notes that a central Third World complaint,
expressed in the NWIO debate, is the frequent imbalance in the flow of
communications.155 On one level, this complaint may be labeled "news
imperialism."' 58 Olasope, new director for the Nigerian Broadcasting Sys-
tem, complains that:
The new states . . .and the Third World are today preoccupied with
social and economic development.... To them, but not to the Western
correspondents, this development is what is new and relevant.... The
development, and indeed transformation that is going on all around, is
hardly ever noticed while events or issues that are insignificant or that in
no way contribute to the progress of the nation, but rather create a bad
image, get interpreted from a Western point of view, and are blown up
all out of proportion.57
For newspapers have foreign correspondents due to the considerable
expense involved.158 Some 90 percent of daily international news is trans-
mitted through four Western news agencies: Agence France-Presse
153 Id.
15 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 124.
15 Id.
151 For an explanation of this concept see, SMrrH, supra note 94, at c.3.
157 Tartarian, supra note 132, at 25.
" The cost of maintaining a foreign-based correspondent averages between $150,000
and $200,000 a year. Newsday, July 3, 1980, at pt. H/3, coL 1.
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(AFP), Associated Press (AP), Reuters, and United Press International
(UPI).159 None profit greatly from the news operations, and only UPI is
truly capitalistic.160 Tass of the Soviet Union along with 120 other news
agencies 61 are peripheral to the NWIO debate over balanced communica-
tion flows.
These agencies have evolved by following and supporting colonial ec-
onomic developments. As transportation systems and commerce devel-
oped in colonies, so did the agencies. Reuters, a trust owned by the
United Kingdom press, has strong contacts in former British colonies.162
AFP, subsidized and partly controlled by the French Government, has
made particularly intense efforts to cover former French colonies.168 AP, a
nonprofit American cooperative and UPI, a private American enterprise,
supply much of their copy to American sources.""
There is support for the notion that these agencies cover developed
States more closely than they do developing States, and dispatch stories
with a Western focus. 65 Journalists direct their efforts toward what they
think is relevant and plausible in a given society; furthermore, a majority
of correspondents are based in Western offices, 66 "where the news is."
Correspondents in developing States make extensive use of local in-
formation sources for their stories, sources which are often controlled by
the government.1 67 A foreign correspondent must also remember the per-
spective of the State from which he is reporting. Harassment and expul-
sion are not uncommon responses to "unfavorable" coverage 6 ' and na-
"I UNESCO INT'L COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF COM. PROBLEMS, THE WORLD OF NEWS
AGENCIES, Report No. 11 (undated).
160 UPI was formed in 1958 as a result of a merger between the Hearst Corp., the Inter-
national News Service, and the United Press Co. Scripps-Howard owns a majority of the
UPI shares. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1958, at 1, col. 3.
161 Only AFP, AP, Reuters, and UPI transmit stories to all corners of the world and
have a large variety of subscribers and foreign bureaus. Krolott and Cohen, New World
Information Order 7, Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Nov. 1977).
612 Bishop, How Reuters and APP Coverage of Independent Africa Compares, 52 Joan-
NALISM Q. 654, 655 (1955).
163 Id.
16, See UNESCO, supra note 159.
165 Bishop, supra note 162.
166 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 146 n.1.
167 Government officials are a prime source of information in any country. Further, re-
strictions on citizens' personal freedoms curtails the access of journalists to news. Accord-
ingly, stringers are a major source of reports for agencies. UNESCO, supra note 159.
166 Numerous accounts of harassment of journalists may be noted, such as the detaining
of a freelance journalist in Bolivia on charges of defamatory libel following a coup. N.Y.
Times, August 14, 1980, at 12, col. 1., a government refusal to allow journalists to use gov-
ernment-controlled transmission services where the stories were "against the Government."
N.Y. Times, February 10, 1980, at 3, col. 1 and even the murder of a reporter viewed with
suspicion by a government army fighting an uprising, the death of ABC News reporter Bill
Vol. 14:387
NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER
tionals may be subject to more severe pressures. Yet, most agencies sell
their reports through national agencies, which then relay them to sub-
scribers, filtering out stories as they choose.""9
Foreign correspondents might breach local customs in their report-
age, even using governmental sources of information. As one commenta-
tor complains, the root problem with news agency "coverage are [sic] usu-
ally a failure to present events within an African context or setting,
emphasis on personalities rather than on problems, and the search for
simple explanations of complex problems. '17 0 It might be argued that this
is a problem central to all journalism and not isolated with regard to cov-
erage of developing States.
The central complaint in the NWIO debate appears to be directed at
news coverage of developing States by agencies which are: accountable
only to predominantly Western subscribers, applying standards and news
values that do not meet the needs of the societies covered, and in need of
enforced accountability to ensure balanced communication flows.1 1 The
MacBride Report stresses that communication is integral to developing a
culture, be it in the Third World or in developed countries. However, to
break through present cultural imbalances and harmful impacts of com-
munication systems is a "long-term evolutionary" process of improving
training programs and promoting citizen participation.
1 7 2
The IPDC represents a first step toward improving the quality of
communication systems. Promoting citizen participation and mitigating
the notion that people are generally passive recipients is a more difficult
task. Most States proclaim free communication to be integral to their
laws and institutions.1 7 s The MacBride Report proposes to promote this
Stewart in Nicaragua, in July 1979. Newsday, supra note 158.
169 Up to 82 percent of news agency accounts enter foreign countries only through gov-
ernment-controlled channels. Reuters reports the highest percentage of sales to "unat-
tached" subscribers at 27 percent. See Pinch, supra note 121.
170 Segal, Africa and the United States Media, 6 Issue 49, 52 (1976).
171 On one level, this may be an editing chore such as an agency transmitting an ac-
count of former Chile President Salvador Allende, and describing him as a Marxist in the
report. Some countries might disagree with this designation. Or, it may be a complaint that
the reporting about the 1978 Jonestown massacre in Guyana was not placed in a context of
Guyana's efforts to diversify its economy and populate wilderness areas.
Perhaps the strongest example of the Western media's alleged failure to report accu-
rately a Third World or developing statehood ideology (when that was a major component
of the story) is the coverage given to recent events in Iran. While there were notable excep-
tions, most Western news coverage repeatedly referred to major social reforms instituted by
the Shah and the nation's support of him without examining such claims. Dorman &
Omeed, Reporting the Shah's Way, 17 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. 27 (1979). See also Said,
Iran and the Press: Whose Holy War? 18 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 23 (1980).
171 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 246.
171 See this text section II B.2.
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free communication and cultural development by aiding the development
of an international code of ethics for journalists, with policies and en-
forcement mechanisms free from government control.174 Yet, according to
one member of the MacBride Commission, such "excessive" or "exclu-
sive" professionalization may in turn create barriers to the democratiza-
tion of communication.175
B. Recommendation 58 on Legal Measures to Promote
Communications
As a method of promoting cultural development and balanced com-
munication flows through the NWIO, the MacBride Commission states
that "censorship or arbitrary control of information should be abol-
ished. 1 1 6 This should be achieved through Recommendation 58:
Effective legal measures should be designed to: (a) limit the process of
concentration and monopolization; (b) circumscribe the action of trans-
nationals by requiring them to comply with specific criteria and condi-
tions defined by national legislation and development policies; (c) reverse
trends to reduce the number of decision-makers at a time when the me-
dia's public is growing larger and the impact of communication is in-
creasing; (d) reduce the influence of advertising upon editorial policy and
broadcast programming; (e) seek and improve models which would en-
sure greater independence and autonomy of the media concerning their
management and editorial policy, whether these media are under private,
public or government ownership. 177
At first reading, the Commission's Goal and Recommendation appear
compatible with U.S. first amendment ideals.17 8 Justice Stewart of the
U.S. Supreme Court has written that, "[S]o far as the Constitution goes,
the autonomous press may publish what it knows and may seek to learn
what it can. 179 Furthermore, first amendment values "should mean at
least this: if we must choose whether editorial decisions are made in the
free judgment of individual broadcasters or imposed by bureaucratic fiat,
the choice must be made for freedom."180
The recommendation to diffuse the monopolization of communica-
tion purveyors is also consistent with the U.S. norm of the right of com-
munication. Not only is the U.S. press subject to antimonopoly legisla-
174 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 243.
178 Id. at 244 n.2.
17 Id. at 266.
177 Id.
178 U.S. CONST., amend. I.
171 Stewart, supra note 24.
18O Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 146 (Stewart,
J., concurring 1973).
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tion,' s ' but the United States, through such statutes as the Newspaper
Preservation Act,182 also encourages competition between independent
newspapers8 3 and promotes broadcasting which is responsive to local
needs.'8 4 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that broadcasters are
subject to regulation in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity.'18 5
One court has added that an important factor in permitting a broadcast
outlet to retain its license is "superior past performance" as measured by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 8 6
The MacBride Report recommendation of limited control over adver-
tising and private commercial decisionmaking similarly finds support in
the American ideal. But, in the United States, control generally appears
to be a form of banning only those advertisements that are either dis-
criminatory' 7 or contain false information about lawful activity.' 8
To be sure, Recommendation 58 does conflict with the American con-
stitutional construct. As legal support, the MacBride Report cites a U.N.
General Assembly resolution on the right of correction containing "a
principle that the points of view presented by those who consider that the
information published or disseminated about them has seriously
prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and international understand:
ing to promote human rights.., be disseminated."' 89 This principle is in
direct contrast to the American right for the press alone to decide those
messages which it will disseminate.'9 0
The U.S. constitutional framework is offered as setting minimal con-
straints on the right to communicate. If Recommendation 58 is compati-
ble with the U.S. framework, within which communications thrive, it is
indeed a workable principle for developing international communication
freedom and balanced flows within a NWIO.
181 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
182 Newspaper Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976).
M For example, an administrative law judge reviewed the application of two newspa-
pers in Seattle, Washington, for a joint operation. After considering the testimony of news-
paper representatives as well as the balance sheets, the judge recommended to the U.S.
Attorney General that the "merger" be permitted to sustain two competing "independent
editorial voices" in Seattle (Under the Newspaper Preservation Act). Brandon, Provisional
OK Given to JOA in Seattle, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER 9, Jan. 23, 1982.
18 Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-98 (1976).
185 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
16 Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
187 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Public Comm. on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
188 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). But
see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 49 U.S.L.W. 4925 (July 2, 1981).
188 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 249.
,90 Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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V. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE NWIO
The MacBride Report recognizes that new communication technolo-
gies-computers, transborder data services and flows, satellites--"may
one day facilitate breaking down barriers between persons and nations.
That trend is without doubt irreversible."' 91 New technologies raise anew
the themes of the NWIO debate: reduced control by receiving States over
the development of the communication systems, obstacles to citizen par-
ticipation in operating the communications service, little availability of
the service, and negative impacts upon traditional modes of communica-
tion. Although UNESCO has actively discussed broadcast satellites, 9 2
and the MacBride Report devotes much consideration to telecommunica-
tion issues,9 3 the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) re-
mains the major international institution for addressing telecommunica-
tion issues.
A. The International Telecommunication Union
Telecommunications-communications via the electromagnetic spec-
trum-has long been a field requiring accommodation between the con-
cept of nationalism and the benefits of an international communication
system. Founded in 1865 to help regulate telegraphic transmissions across
European national boundaries, the ITU expanded to fill this need.,9 The
advent of radio, with its ability to travel across national boundaries and
interfere with the transmissions of other States, posed additional regula-
tory needs. 9 5 Although the United Nations, in 1959, appointed a separate
committee to study communication satellites, 96 the committee recognized
that the ITU was best equipped to deal with radio frequency allocations
in outer space.' 5 ' Eventually, the ITU became a specialized agency of the
United Nations and expanded its role to include regulation of radio, tele-
vision, telephones, and satellites.198
The ITU has foremost concerned itself with its technical, regulatory
role. But this role cannot be isolated from present political and economic
pressures. Participation in the ITU is on an equal basis, one vote per
191 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 31.
192 Declaration of Guiding Principles, supra note 117.
192 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 57-68.
194 Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1980).
195 International Telecommunications Convention of 1965, entered into force, May 29,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. No. 6267.
196 G.A. Res. 1472A, 14 U.N. GAOR 5, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
197 Id.
19" International Telecommunications Convention of 1947, entered into force Jan. 1,
1949, 63 Stat. 1399, T.I.A.S. No. 1901, 30 U.N.T.S. 316.
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member State. 199 In 1947, for instance, there were only 78 member States
all bound by treaty to the ITU governing principles.20 0 Today, there are
154 members, many of which are former colonies of older, developed
member States. 01
The ability of these new members to affect fundamental change in
the ITU is circumscribed by jurisdictional and organizational constraints.
For example, only the most technically advanced States have a present
capacity for satellite systems. An interest in perpetuating this sovereignty
supersedes any ITU designs to promote mutual cooperation.
1. The International Frequency Regulatory Board
Complaints have been directed by new members toward the fairness
of the ITU's basic administrative regulations defining radio frequencies,
allocating spectrums, and imposing technical requirements on opera-
tions.20 2 Having primary responsibility for resolving these complaints is
the ITU's International Frequency Regulatory Board (IFRB).
The Board operates a first-come-first-served system whereby a State
applies for a radio frequency assignment and if that assignment would
not interfere with another 'assignment, the applicant receives something
akin to a vested property right to use that frequency. 20 3 The IFRB is
powerless to remove assignments not actually being used without the con-
sent of the "owner" government.20 ' Assignments are monitored only by
data supplied by member States; 20 5 the ITU cannot compel members to
supply this information.
20
In addition, members are bound by ITU regulations only to the ex-
tent that their broadcasts "are capable of causing harmful interference to
the services rendered by the stations of another country. ' '20 7 Yet, any dis-
299 The governing principles of the International Telecommunications Union may be
found in International Telecommunications Convention, entered into force Apr. 7, 1976, 28
U.S.T. 2497, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter ITU Convention]. For an analysis of the back-
ground and administration of the ITU, see D. LEivE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM (1970) [hereinafter
Leive].
200 A. Rutkowski, International Data Transfer, Satellite Communications, and the
1979 World Administrative Radio Conference, in THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER:
ISSUES IN THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE AND TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW 3, 6
(Com. Media Ctr., N.Y.L. Sch. 1979).
20" Honig, Lessons for the 1999 WARC, 28 J. COM. 48, 50 (1979).
202 See Rutkowski, supra note 200, at 7.
203 See International Telecommunications Union Radio Regulations, entered into force
Oct. 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No. 4893 at para. 607 [hereinafter ITU Rad. Reg.].
20 ITU Convention, supra note 199, at art. 33.
202 LEIVE, supra note 199, at 102.
2'6 See, e.g., ITU Rad. Reg., supra note 203, at para. 516.
207 Id. at paras. 700-15.
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putes on regulations or interferences are settled outside of ITU channels
and left to ad hoc diplomatic channels or various international treaties on
dispute resolution.20 s This procedure is used even though the IFRB main-
tains an objective body of independent technical experts to examine in-
terference disputes as requested by concerned governments.'"
Plenipotentiary conferences are ideally the ultimate forum for ad-
dressing the need for changes in the ITU.210 However, since these confer-
ences meet irregularly, approximately every five years,211 it is questiona-
ble whether the conferences can keep fully current on technical
developments in communications. Nonetheless, the primary mechanism
for adjusting regulations concerning spectrum allocations, and impliedly
initiating policy changes for the ITU, is periodic world administrative
conferences, 212 the most recent being the 1979 World Administrative Con-
ference (WARC).
2. The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference
WARC convenes only once every 20 years.21 3 In a broad sense, the
Conference has jurisdiction over all radio regulations and is empowered to
discuss issues of individual spectral assignments along with the global al-
location of spectra to specific communication uses.214 Underlying all Con-
ference deliberations are four competing, yet overlapping, policy con-
cerns: 1) a fair division of a limited international resource among
competing needs and States; 2) the allocation of resources so as to maxi-
mize the positive impact on the quality of life; 3) alternatives to the spec-
tral uses possible today which might be technologically obsolete in the
near future; and 4) the maximization of cost/benefit efficiencies of each
allocation decision.
Although each delegation averaged approximately 12 participants,
this statistic obscures the complexity of the issues discussed and how de-
veloping States were not as prepared for the debates as were developed
States. Honig, a delegate for the United States, said that developed coun-
tries had 49 percent of the delegates at WARC, 1 3 yet only 28 percent of
208 Members for instance may invoke an arbitration procedure provided for at ITU
Convention, supra note 199, at art. 33 Annex 3.
209 ITU Rad. Reg., supra note 203, at para. 716.
210 Cf., Note, The International Telecommunications Union, 31 SASK. B. REv. 41, 47
(1966).
211 Id.
212 Cf., Robinson, supra note 194, at 7.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 7 n.21.
215 See Honig, supra note 201.
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the votes.2"' The United States began preparations for the conference in
1973217 and focused the interests of engineers, entrepreneurs, and politi-
cians through a broad array of governmental bodies before finalizing a
coherent policy.2 18 By contrast, Ghana sent a two-man delegation to
WARC; unable to devote its energies to the full agenda, these delegates
focused on Ghana's potential interests in satellite broadcasting.
21 9
Satellite communications have indeed been a central focus of many
WARC delegations. 220 Only 35 years ago, Arthur C. Clarke wrote of a vi-
sion of geostationary satellites aiding international radio programming.
221
Today, technological developments have necessitated discussion of direct
satellite broadcasts to individual homes.222
More importantly, satellite communication offers great potential for
achieving a NWIO. Developing States might be able to utilize satellites to
by-pass intricate and costly terrestrial communication infrastructures and
achieve cost and service equality with developed countries.223 An alloca-
tion and regulation schema is important to reaching this possibility. Such
a plan was even more important at the 1979 WARC if one considers that
the decisions of that Conference will remain in place, impacting upon
communication developments, until the next century and the 1999
WARC.
The International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (IN-
TELSAT) dominates present-day international communication service.2 24
Over 130 countries are serviced by this consortium which utilizes nonmili-
tary satellites. 22 5 Projections228 of increased demands for domestic point-
to-point communications-voice, data, electronic mail, and televi-
sion-were beyond a major WARC discussion concerning proposals to
make new allocations in a spectrum currently used by other services.
227
This would permit developing States to receive spectrum rights in the
216 Id.
217 Id. at 48. But see Possner, Legislative Involvement in Telecommunications Policy:
the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference, in THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER:
ISSUES IN THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIvE RADIO CONFERENCE AND TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW 17
(Com. Media Ctr., N.Y.L. Sch. 1979).
218 Possner, supra note 217, at 19.
229 See Honig, supra note 201, at 50.
220 Id.
2 Clarke, Extra-Terrestrial Relays -Can Rocker Stations Give World-Wide Radio
Coverage?, WIRELEss WORLD 305 (1945).
222 Rice, Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites: International Constraints and Do-
mestic Options, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 813 (1980).
223 Snow, INTELSAT: An International Experience, 30 J. CoM. 147 (1980).
224 The MacBride Report, supra note 4, at 288.
225 Robinson, supra note 194, at 18, 19 n.55.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 20-21.
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new area, even though it might be years before they could develop satel-
lites and exploit the frequency. Acceptance of the proposal would have
entailed reducing allocations for radar and defense228 and relinquishing
the frequencies for use in projected development as INTELSAT costs in-
creased.229 The United States did not accept such reallocations,22 0 practi-
cably blocking the developing countries' plan and maintaining the status
quo.
At WARC, increased allocations were agreed upon for low-spectrum
uses (called high-frequencies) 231 which include most radio and long-dis-
tance communications. Services such as shortwave transmissions have
been valuable for administering farflung social programs and providing
relatively inexpensive communication linkages. According to Glen Robin-
son, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to WARC, such a reallocation
might meet projected demand increases until the 1999 WARC. 23 2 How-
ever, increased allocations do little to alleviate the impact of the IFRB
granting every country some frequency rights until the spectra are over-
subscribed. Countries are not compelled to relinquish those frequencies
for which they no longer, or not yet, have a use.23 8 Because of the dead-
lock on the NWIO debate, there was little progress made at WARC to-
ward reforming the IFRB, satellite distributions, or creating a more equi-
table rationing of assigned frequencies.
B. U.S. Regulatory Impact Upon International Telecommunications
Decisionmaking: The Federal Communications Commission and Rate
Making
Satellite allocation discussions indicate the importance of the U.S.
position at WARC relative to Conference outcomes. Honig criticizes the
American delegation for virtually ignoring social input and concentrating
on issues "relative to political and technical criteria.' '23 ' These U.S. posi-
tions, so important to WARC, were in turn largely determined by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and related agencies. 3 5
228 Id. at 21-22.
229 Id. at 20.
230 Id.
2" Id. at 28-30.
232 Id. at 28-33.
233 ITU Rad. Reg., supra note 203, at para. 620.
23, See Honig, supra note 201.
2315 The United States prepared for WARC through the regulatory process. The FCC
has the power to assign domestic frequencies and regulate, based upon agreements with
foreign telecommunication units. Yet, the Commission remains limited to acting in the pub-
lic interest.
The State Department has the specific assignment of representing the United States in
negotiations with foreign governments and international bodies on telecommunications is-
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International communication is relegated to a minor regulatory con-
cern for the FCC. The Agency's mandate is to regulate "interstate and
foreign commerce in communications by wire or radio. '238 Technological
advances in these areas are generally considered when the regulated com-
mon carriers inform the FCC of such improvements. The FCC is also em-
powered to regulate the Communications Satellite Corporation (COM-
SAT),23 7 trustee of a national, private profitmaking system.238 This power
concerns access and use of the satellite system, 3 9 ratemaking and ac-
counting matters, 24 0 and provision of services to international locales.2 41
Overall, the FCC is that regulatory body which responds to technological
policies developed by the international carriers-including AT&T, IT&T,
and COMSAT-as they operate autonomously and at a pace arguably
ahead of the government's ability to regulate consequences. 24 2
The character of this approach to international telecommunication is
built-in complexity and delayed response to immediate problems. Foreign
telecommunications units, so often combining regulatory and operational
entities, tend to operate homogeneously. 243 In contrast, when they seek to
close a deal with private American concerns, the foreign units must con-
sider: first, that American corporations must be responsive to sharehold-
ers; and second, that the FCC will only then begin its application review
process which might result in FCC approval. Furthermore, foreign offi-
cials regard FCC decisions, whether on a specific U.S. corporation agree-
ment or general policy, as an "arbitrary practice of making decisions
without regard for the views held in [a] distant country. '244 Conse-
quently, the governmental body with primary telecommunications re-
sponsibility is mired in delay and accused of ignoring the international
impact of its decisions.
sues. Exec. Order No. 12,046, 3 C.F.R. 158, 164 (1978). In this respect, the Department
generally acts as a troubleshooter on foreign policy issues and also advises the FCC on satil-
lite communications for foreign points. 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(3) (1976).
The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) is assigned the task
of coordinating all preparations for international telecommunications negotiations, but it is
limited to an advisory role.
236 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
217 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 731-44.
23 Id. at § 731.
239 Communications Act, supra note 236, at § 721(c).
240 Id. at § 721(c)(5).
241 Id. at § 721(c)(3).
242 For the purposes of this Note, the FCC is concerned with preserving competition
among common carriers, not expanding the frontiers of legal thought on telecommunication
issues.
2,3 See Robinson, supra note 194.
24 Grad & Goldfarb, International Communication, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 384,
453, quoting 41 Telecommunications Rep. No. 11 at 30-31.
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The FCC is charged with maintaining "just and reasonable rates."24 5
Yet, to illustrate its bureaucratic entanglement, the FCC has not con-
ducted a review of its response to international rate structures since the
Western Union case, 25 years ago, despite intervening technological
change.246 Traditional rate regulation is based upon a return on capital-
intensive activities. But should the same structures for coaxial cables, as
an example, be applied to satellite rates with their larger research and
development cost structure as components?
FCC policy had a significant international impact when the Commis-
sion ruled that COMSAT would be permitted to market its circuits pri-
marily with carriers (such as AT&T), who in turn market the service di-
rectly to the public.2 47 COMSAT applied for its tariff, however, this
review extended over a 10-year period24 s and concluded with a rate reduc-
tion order.2419 Subsequently, this reduction was ordered 250 to be passed
along to customers.
The immediate results of these actions were twofold. First, common
carriers developed a decided preference for cable use because although
lease payments to COMSAT are not included in carrier rate bases, the
physical development and use of cables is included in the rate base, per-
mitting a greater profit. Second, although American carriers were ordered
to pass along cost savings, foreign carriers which joined in the planning of
facilities and the sharing of operations are not under this obligation and
may develop differential rates.
Satellites have numerous advantages over present coaxial cables:
greater capacity, ability to transmit more than one signal, and coverage
for more than two tixed points. There are, however, disadvantages as
well: satellites are considerably more expensive than cables, cannot result
in as strong a rate base, and since INTELSAT controls satellite circuits,
national carriers have less control over them than over privately-financed
cables.2 51
Initially, the FCC responded to the international cable and satellite
usage differences by ordering carriers to activate only one cable circuit for
every five unused satellite circuits which were activated. 25 2 This action
ensured FCC compliance with the Communications Satellite Act of
2'1 Communications Act, supra note 236, at § 201(b).
246 In re Western Union Tel. Co., 25 F.C.C. 535 (1958).
247 In re Authorized Entities and Authorized Users under the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962, 4 F.C.C. 2d 421, 435-36 (1966).
248 In re Communications Satellite Corp., 56 F.C.C. 2d 1101, 1103 (1975).
219 Id. at 1183-86.
210 Id. at 1186-87.
21 Note, The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 76 HARv. L. Ray. 388 (1962).
252 In re TAT-5 Project Proposal, 11 F.C.C. 2d 957 (1968).
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1962253 and, as such, enhanced the benefits of satellites to the public.
Nonetheless, the FCC continued to acerbate tensions with foreign tele-
communication entities: these were only nominally assuaged by the 1976
revised guidelines. These revisions provide for diversity of circuit utiliza-
tion and considerations of international comity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legal framework of the NWIO debate will surely continue to
temper its practical outcome, although a wide range of communication
system working models does persist. Throughout the debates, though,
sovereign States retain the power to shape domestic laws and regulations
and do no more than modify international standards to conform to their
own models.
Yet, it is true that technological change is modifying traditional no-
tions of international communication. These new technologies provide
quantitative and qualitative transformations in communication flows and
offer dramatic possibilities for redressing acknowledged communication
imbalances.
The 1979 WARC and ongoing UNESCO discussions which have ad-
dressed imbalances have had a fourfold impact upon international law.
First, the compromise declarations on mass media from recent UNESCO
Conferences have placed the rights and responsibilities of the mass media
within the overall parameters of international law. Standards of conduct
and protection, albeit vague, are now embodied in official U.N. documents
and are no longer subordinate to the larger debate on human rights
principles.
Second, new regulatory concepts have been introduced to interna-
tional agencies which have accordingly begun to modify their longstand-
ing precepts of organization and function. The ITU, and correspondingly
the FCC, has begun to consider redefining types of satellite services and
ratemaking formula. Economic and cultural concerns are impacting upon
the engineering concerns of the technically-oriented WARC. The United
States and its allies are unable to deny their financial outlays to
UNESCO and the ITU, and have learned to effectively negotiate for their
goals within these pluralistic organizations.
Third, deficiencies in international decisionmaking have been high-
lighted. The ITU is without true enforcement power to equitably dis-
tribute and monitor frequency assignments and spectrum allocation.
Traditional diplomacy and treatymaking on an ad hoc basis prevails over
any institutionalized enforcement mechanism, objectively balancing and
judging disparate claims. Similarly, UNESCO has only been able to issue
253 Communications Act, supra note 236, at §§ 741-44.
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declarations on communication which are but one step in the process of
developing a binding treaty.
Fourth, the cumulative effect of these debates shall intensify in sub-
sequent decades. The MacBride Report provides a conceptual basis for
discussion by which the gross imperfections of the present world informa-
tion order may be addressed. It makes concrete recommendations which
are compatible with a "free flow of communication" somewhat more bal-
anced than are communication flows at present. Also, an agenda is pro-
posed in place of technology itself, for "practical" changes in communica-
tion arrangements.
In retrospect, one is amazed that there is any coherent debate deal-
ing with communication flows. So diverse are the governmental interests
involved and the avenues by which claims may be raised, that the Mac-
Bride Report assumes an enhanced importance in the international legal
arena. Coupled with the WARC, different legal concepts of a right to
communicate, and the influence of the communication technologies are all
adding direction to a new world information order.
